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Abstract 
Market anomalies are one of the most intriguing and fascinating phenomena observed in financial 
markets. This paper examines the incidence of price clustering in US and European bank stocks during 
the Global Financial Crisis. The results reveal a significant level of price clustering in European and 
US banks’ samples, which is difficult to reconcile with the Efficient Market hypothesis. The Attraction 
hypothesis and the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypothesis seem to be the best explanations for the 
clustering effect. However, the results also suggest that the uncertainty associated with the crisis did 
not have a significant impact in the clustering levels, which is at odds with the recently proposed Panic 
Trading hypothesis. Surprisingly, we observe a tendency to have less price clustering during the period 
of crisis and banks located in countries mostly affected by the European sovereign debt crisis exhibit 
lower levels of price clustering. These results are consistent with the idea that investors tend to be 
more analytical in their appraisals in periods of negative sentiment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Market anomalies are one of the most intriguing and fascinating phenomena observed in 
financial markets. One of the most studied issues over the last decades has been price 
clustering, with the first evidence published in the 1960s (Osborne, 1962). The Efficient 
Market hypothesis posits that prices should follow a random walk and fully reflect all 
available information. Being prices in theory the reflection of the assets’ fundamental value, 
there is no apparent reason to observe an accumulation of prices in certain levels or numbers. 
However, there is extensive evidence showing that certain prices are traded more frequently 
than others (Niederhoffer, 1965; Harris, 1991; Mitchell, 2001; Ikenberry and Weston, 2008).  
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The debate on the determinants of price clustering is still ongoing. Stock price 
clustering was found to depend on variables such as price level, idiosyncratic volatility, firm 
size, trade size, transaction frequency and liquidity (Christie et al., 1994; Aitken et al., 
1996). More recently, Narayan and Smyth (2013) proposed the "panic trading hypothesis" 
according to which when investors are in a period of heightened stress they tend to quickly 
settle on a rounded price in order to avoid selling at a lower price at a later moment. 
Therefore, prices should exhibit higher levels of clustering in those circumstances. Narayan 
and Smyth (2013) found support for the panic trading hypothesis in their case study about 
the Fiji’s stock market. However, to date, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
other test on the panic trading hypothesis. In this paper we fill this gap by conducting a 
study on the impact of financial instability associated with the Global Financial Crisis on the 
incidence of price clustering in the US and European bank stocks. 
Overall, the results show significant levels of price clustering in bank stocks. However, 
the financial crisis does not seem to have had a significant impact on the observed levels of 
clustering. On the contrary, our results reveal a tendency to lower levels of price clustering 
in the crisis period. In addition, our cross-sectional analysis shows that price clustering was 
negatively associated with liquidity in both the US and European bank stocks. 
This paper is structured as follows: the 2nd Section presents a literature review and the 
3rd Section describes the data and methodology. The 4th Section analyzes the results and, 
finally, the 5th Section exposes the main conclusions.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Definition and main hypotheses behind price clustering 
 
The concept of price clustering originates from the studies of Osborne and 
Niederhoffer published in the 1960s. Osborne (1962) presented evidence of a tendency for 
certain share prices to spend an inordinate amount of time at a certain price range. In an 
efficient market, prices should be uniformly distributed and price clustering should not exist 
(Niederhoffer, 1965; De Grauwe and Decupere, 1992; Aitken et al., 1996). Assuming that 
the price of an asset is nothing more than the reflection of its intrinsic value, in the absence 
of market frictions there would be no reason for certain prices to be observed more 
frequently than others. 
Mitchell (2001) suggested some reasons for the emergence of this phenomenon. One 
of these conditions is the dominance of a certain market by a small number of investors, 
which makes it difficult for a certain biased behavior to be eliminated of the market. Other 
reasons pointed out include the existence of trading impediments that prevent the 
observance of some values, the generalized preference of the market participants for certain 
numbers and the existence of biases in the decision-making environment. One or more of 
these conditions would be sufficient for that trading behavior to be reflected in an 
empirically observable phenomenon. Alternatively, P. Brown and Mitchell (2008) defined 
price clustering as the concentration of stock prices on some numbers rather than others as a 
result of human bias, imprecise beliefs or haziness about the underlying value of a security. 
The literature presents five main hypotheses to explain price clustering: the Price 
Resolution hypothesis, the Negotiation hypothesis, the Attraction hypothesis, the Collusion 
hypothesis, and the Panic Trading hypothesis. 
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The Price Resolution hypothesis (Ball et al., 1985) states that the uncertainty about the 
intrinsic value of a given security causes market participants to use coarser price grids, 
which in turn generates price clustering. This hypothesis also suggests that the degree of 
price resolution is related to the amount of information available in the market. For example, 
larger companies that are followed by a large number of financial analysts should have a 
higher level of information. This will allow for a larger price set and lower levels of 
clustering. On the other hand, the level of price resolution should be negatively related to the 
price level since the higher the value of an asset, the greater the tendency for market 
participants to use a coarser price grid. Stock price volatility is also expected to impact the 
clustering level as volatility can be understood as a reflection of the uncertainty regarding 
the intrinsic value of a given asset. Moreover, a higher level of trading liquidity can be 
associated to a higher level of information and thus less clustering. In short, the lower the 
quantity and quality of information in the market, the greater the uncertainty; the lower the 
level of price resolution and more likely price clustering will be observed. 
According to the Price Negotiation hypothesis (Harris, 1991), one should observe 
greater clustering when the negotiation costs are larger. That is the case, for example, for 
high volume transactions, when the market, industry or firm are characterized with greater 
volatility or when the price level is high. Harris (1991) argues that price clustering occurs 
because investors use discrete price sets as a mechanism to reduce the cost of negotiating 
transactions. In periods of abnormally heavy trading, as is the case of periods of crisis, 
where uncertainty levels soar, the need to execute trades quickly and with the least possible 
cost leads market participants to reduce their terms of trading. By using a coarser price grid, 
individuals are reducing the amount of information that has to be processed, making 
transactions to occur more swiftly, as bid and offer prices converge more rapidly. In 
summary, the negotiation hypothesis states that prices cluster at round numbers to reduce 
negotiation costs and time to make a deal during transactions. 
The Attraction hypothesis proposed by Curcio and Goodhart (1991) suggests that there is 
a natural tendency for individuals to feel more attracted to certain numbers rather than others 
without any apparent rational motivation, creating clustering in certain price points. Several 
studies on the Attraction hypothesis have concluded that in a decimal system, transaction 
prices ending in zero are more often observed because this number is more salient. After 0, the 
5 is the stronger attracter, followed by the even numbers 2 and 8. The 1 and 9 are the least 
observed digits because there will be a natural attraction for 0 (the most observed digit). The 
relative frequency of 3 will be the same as 7. The same can be said for 4 and 6. However, there 
is no clear evidence as to which of these groups, {3 = 7} and {4 = 6} should be more common, 
depending on the "gravitational pull" of the 5 in relation to the adjacent even numbers and the 
preference of the individuals for even rather than odd numbers.  
The Collusion hypothesis was firstly suggested by Christie et al. (1994), arguing that 
traders intentionally collude to set non-competitive bid-ask spreads. The authors show that 
the structure of multiple dealers in the NASDAQ market leads to an incentive to maintain 
non-competitive bid-ask spreads through an agreement to avoid odd eight quotes, thus 
resulting is an increase in their profit margins per transaction and price clustering.  
Finally, Narayan and Smyth (2013) proposed the Panic Trading hypothesis. The 
hypothesis states that in a period of heightened market uncertainty investors should be more 
prone to settle quickly on a rounded price to avoid having to sell at a lower price at a later 
moment. Therefore, one expects to observe a higher incidence of price clustering in those 
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circumstances. Narayan and Smyth (2013) found that political instability in Fiji triggered 
price clustering behavior thus confirming the Panic Trading hypothesis. 
 
2.2 Previous empirical evidence 
 
Osborne (1962), Niederhoffer (1965), Harris (1991) and Christie et al. (1994) were 
among the first to study the microeconomics of price formation and to document that US 
prices cluster around whole numbers and common fractions. 
Aitken et al. (1996) documented the existence of price clustering in equity markets out-
side the US that used decimal trading rather than fractions. The authors analyzed the last digit 
of individual trade prices on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASE) using intraday transaction 
data. The results confirmed the Price Resolution hypothesis, but also showed evidence in favor 
of the Attraction hypothesis, with prices ending in 0 being the most preferred, followed by 
prices ending in 5 and even digits. Clustering increased with the market-wide volatility, own 
stock volatility, price level, trade size and the size of the bid-ask spread. Unlike Harris (1991), 
their results showed greater clustering for larger firms. In addition, they were able to observe 
in their sample a lower level of clustering for shares with options traded on them, for stocks in 
which short selling was allowed and in more liquid stocks. 
Hameed and Terry (1998) studied price clustering in limit orders in the Singapore 
Stock Exchange, a fully electronic order-driven market. The authors found clustering at all 
price ranges, with whole dollars being more frequent than half dollars, which in turn were 
more often observed than prices ending in multiples of 10 cents. After this, in descending 
order of frequency, prices ending in odd-multiples of 5 cents were the most observed. The 
authors found support for the Negotiation hypothesis, with clustering increasing with price 
level and decreasing with trading volume, despite their findings showed no consistent 
relationship between clustering and stock price volatility. 
P. Brown et al. (2002) were the first to study the impact of cultural factors on price 
clustering, analyzing six Asia-Pacific stock markets and concluding for the pervasiveness of 
stock price clustering in all markets. Thus, the authors found evidence supporting both the 
Price Resolution and the Attraction hypotheses. Moreover, cultural factors were shown not 
to have a significant influence on clustering. 
Ohta (2006) investigated price clustering on the Tokyo Stock Exchange with intraday 
data. His results were consistent with the Price Resolution hypothesis. Price clustering 
seemed to be higher just after the market opening when the level of uncertainty is higher. 
However, Aşçıoğlu et al. (2007), using quotes from the same exchange, only found limited 
support for the Price Resolution hypothesis and concluded that this anomaly was best 
explained by the Attraction theory. 
Ikenberry and Weston (2008), in their study on the impact of decimalization on price 
clustering, found evidence in support of the Negotiation and Price Resolution hypotheses. 
Adopting a different approach, Blau and Griffith (2016), tested the hypothesis that 
clustering in round pricing increments would result in more volatile financial markets, since 
stocks with a greater degree of clustering will have less informative prices. The authors 
evidenced that causation flows from clustering to volatility instead of the other way around. 
Regarding the Collusion hypothesis, Huang and Stoll (1996) concluded that collusion 
in a multiple dealer market with easy entry is extremely unlikely to occur. On the contrary, 
Aşçıoğlu et al. (2007) analyzed the Tokyo Stock Exchange, where trading takes place 
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electronically without market markers, so explicit collusive behavior could not exist and still 
found evidence of price clustering. 
More recently, Das and Kadapakkam (2018) examined time trends in price clustering 
for Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) and individual stocks, evidencing a substantial 
reduction in clustering over the sample period (2001-2010). The authors attributed that to 
the increasing proeminence of algorithmic trading, which seems to be less susceptible to 
psychological biases. 
Different studies evidenced the existence of price clustering in other asset classes such 
as exchange rates (Curcio and Goodhart, 1991; Sopranzetti and Datar, 2002), initial public 
offerings and seasoned equity offerings (Kandel et al., 2001; Mola and Loughran, 2004; Hu 
et al., 2019), commodities (Bharati et al., 2012; Palao and Pardo, 2012), derivatives (ap 
Gwilym et al., 1998; Narayan et al., 2011), betting markets (A. Brown and Yang, 2016), and 
cryptocurrencies (Urquhart, 2017; Baig et al., 2019). These papers presented evidence 
supporting the different hypotheses, underlining the empirical nature of this issue. For 
instance, Kandel et al. (2001) and Narayan et al. (2011) supported the Attraction hypothesis, 
whereas ap Gwilym et al. (1998) found only limited evidence for this explanation, 
preferring the Price Resolution hypothesis and Mola and Loughran (2004) and Hu et al. 
(2019) both provided support for the Negotiation hypothesis.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The present paper uses daily closing prices from two samples, one with US bank 
stocks and the other with bank stocks from nine European countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Spain), with a different crisis 
period for each one. Following Davis et al. (2009), we define the crisis period for the US 
banks’ sample as the period from October 9, 2007 to March 9, 2009. Regarding the sample 
of European banks, we follow Attinasi et al. (2009) to define the European crisis period as 
the period between July 31, 2007 and March 25, 2009. To set the periods before the crisis, 
we use a range of 24 months before each of the periods defined above. All data were 
obtained from Thompson Reuters DataStream. 
 
3.2 Univariate analysis 
 
We will carry out a univariate analysis of the frequency with which the last digit of the 
stock prices is observed. According to the null hypothesis of non-existence of price 
clustering, it is expected a frequency of 0.10 for each digit. Following Ikenberry and Weston 
(2008), we then apply an adaptation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) to measure 
price clustering. This index is usually used to assess market concentration, but in this case it 
will be used to measure the concentration of prices and how different it is from a uniform 
distribution. The statistic will be computed by adding the squared values of the percentage 
of prices ending in certain digits, that is: 
 
HHI = ∑(fi)
2
B
i=1
 (1) 
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where fi is the frequency (in percent) of closing stock prices that occur at fractions 
i=1,2,…B possible bins. If there was no price clustering, HHI should be equal to 1/10 = 0.1, 
since each digit would have a frequency of 10%. In the case of perfect price clustering, 
where prices are concentrated entirely on a single digit, HHI would equal unity. In order to 
compare the price clustering between the two periods under analysis, before and during the 
crisis, and to determine whether the level of price clustering actually changed in the 
financial crisis period, this paper uses two frequently used statistics in this kind of analysis 
(Ikenberry and Weston, 2008; Palao and Pardo, 2012). First, to test the significance of price 
clustering in a given sample over a given period, it is used the standard Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit statistic that, according to the null hypothesis (hypothesis H1, from now on) 
of absence of difference between the observed distribution and the expected uniform 
distribution should be below some critical value. We define this statistic, D, as follows: 
 
D = ∑
(Oi − Ei)
2
Ei
N
i=1
 (2) 
where Oi is the observed frequency of observations in bin i = 1,…, N and Ei is the expected 
frequency of observations under the null uniform distribution. D has a Chi-square distribution 
with N-1 degrees of freedom under standard regularity conditions. A larger value of D would 
signify a deviation from the expected distribution, thus implying price clustering. 
 
After this first step, we use the following statistic to compare the level of price 
clustering between the two periods under analysis and between subsamples: 
 
D̃ = (
D2
D1
) ~ FN2−1,N1−1 (3) 
where 𝐷𝑖  ~ 𝜒𝑁−1
2  
 
Under the null hypothesis (hypothesis H2, from now on), the two samples considered 
are equally clustered. We use this statistic to test the hypothesis that the level of price 
clustering has changed between the periods before (D1) and during the financial crisis (D2) 
for each subsample. Higher values of D̃ would mean a significantly higher level of 
clustering in one of the subsamples. 
 
3.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
The multivariate analysis is used to determine which variables can explain price 
clustering at the firm level. Regarding the dependent variable, we follow Ikenberry and 
Weston (2008) to estimate the level of price clustering at the firm level considering all 
closing prices over the sample period. Thus, we will consider the difference between the 
HHI measure and the level of clustering that would be expected under the null hypothesis, 
that is, a HHI value of 0.1.  
The independent variables included in our analysis are expected to capture the firm 
characteristics that may impact on clustering levels. Each independent variable is log-
transformed and standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance. The different variables 
are described below and Table no. 1 presents the description of the variables as well as their 
expected signs. 
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Thus, the following model is estimated using OLS: 
 
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐸(𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑉
+ 𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽15𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽16𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽17𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
(4) 
 
The variables that capture average size (“Size”), average price (“Price”), return 
volatility (“RetVol”), average turnover (“Turnover”) and liquidity (“Illiquidity”) are 
usually included in the studies about price clustering (e.g., Harris, 1991; Ikenberry and 
Weston, 2008). According to the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses larger firms 
tend to display a higher level of information than smaller firms, so a negative relation 
between the size factor and the level of clustering should be expected. Moreover, those 
hypotheses also suggest that the stock price has a highly significant explanatory power in 
the variation of the level of price clustering, and it is expected that as the price level 
increases, the "minimum tick size" will gradually become a smaller percentage of the 
share’s value, leading investors to use a coarser price grid. It should also be expected that 
greater volatility of returns generates greater uncertainty about the value of stocks and that 
this uncertainty will lead investors to round prices, creating price clustering. Regarding 
the variable “Turnover”, the Price Resolution hypothesis suggests that banks that present 
a higher turnover should exhibit a lower level of clustering. Also, the greater the liquidity 
of a stock, the lower should be the level of clustering, since prices tend to be known with 
a higher degree of precision.  
The variable “PastReturns” is expected to have a negative relation with price 
clustering, since higher returns in the past should lead to an increased attention and coverage 
by both investors and analysts (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000), which in turn should decrease 
the level of uncertainty about the stock price. In theory, growth stocks (captured by the 
variable “BTM”) should be more affected by clustering. As pointed out by Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), this type of stocks tends to attract naïve investors whose biases might lead to 
clustering in prices. Following Blau and Griffith (2016), we expect that a higher number of 
analysts (“AnalystCoverage”) covering a stock will lead to less uncertainty and, 
consequently, less price clustering.  
The model also includes three variables (“Loans”, “Investments” and “Deposits”) that 
intend to capture bank’s opacity, since more opaque banks should exhibit a higher degree of 
price clustering. According to Wen (2016, p. 140), “loans are customized, privately 
negotiated and illiquid” which makes them “major contributors to bank opacity”. The author 
also considers trading assets as a major contributor to bank opacity, since some of them are 
difficult to value by outsiders and are prone to management manipulations. With a similar 
argument, the inclusion of the variable “Deposits” in the model is supported by the work of 
Berger et al. (2000). 
Finally, risk measures (variables “SizeAssetsBV”, “TobinQ”, “CreditRisk”, 
“ROAVOL”, “NIMVOL” and “ZSCORE”) were also included. Anderson and Fraser (2000) 
argue that the size of a bank (measured by the book value of total assets) is positively related 
with risk since the potential benefits of diversification of larger banks are more than offset 
by their adoption of more risky loan portfolios and leverage. These authors also claim that 
the variable “TobinQ” is inversely related with risk, i.e., the lower its value the higher the 
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risk of the banks, which, in theory, should imply more price clustering. Athanasoglou et al. 
(2008) argue that credit risk is normally associated with decreased firm profitability, hence 
it is a variable that is closely linked to the present and future levels of risk. Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2014) use two traditional accounting-based measures of bank’s risk, the volatility of 
return on assets and the volatility of net interest margin, as well as a variable designated by 
“ZSCORE”. The first two measures reflect the degree of risk-taking in a bank’s operations 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009) and the variable “ZSCORE” is a measure of bank stability that 
indicates the distance from insolvency. Specifically, this variable indicates the number of 
standard deviations a bank’s return on assets has to drop below its expected value before 
equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent. Thus, we expect a negative relation between 
this indicator and price clustering. 
 
Table no. 1 – Description of the variables 
Dependent variable 
Variable Description 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
va
ri
a
b
le
 
Clustering – 
E(Clustering) 
HHI (measuring clustering at the last digit) is used as a measure of the firm's 
stock price concentration, less the level of clustering that would be expected 
under the null hypothesis, that is, a HHI value of 0.1. 
Independent variables 
Variable Description 
Expected 
sign 
References 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l 
va
ri
a
b
le
s 
Size 
Daily average of the equity market value of the 
firm. 
- 
Harris (1991) 
Price 
Daily average of the stock price of the firm over 
the sample period. 
+ 
RetVol 
Return volatility computed as the squared time-
series standard deviation of daily returns over 
the sample period. 
+ 
Turnover 
Average turnover (by volume) of the firm over 
the sample period. 
- 
Ikenberry and 
Weston (2008) 
Illiquidity 
Arithmetic mean of the ratio of the bid-ask 
spread to its midpoint over the sample period. 
+ 
Palao and 
Pardo (2012) 
A
d
d
ed
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s PastReturns 
Cumulative return of the firm over the 6 months 
before the sample period. - 
Lee and 
Swaminathan 
(2000) 
BTM 
Average Book Value of Equity over the sample 
period divided by the average market 
capitalization over the sample period. 
- 
Lakonishok et 
al. (1994) 
AnalystCoverage 
Average of the number of analysts following the 
firm over the sample period. 
- 
Blau and 
Griffith (2016) 
B
a
n
k 
O
p
a
ci
ty
 P
ro
xi
es
 
Loans 
Share of loans in total assets. Opacity measure 
computed as the daily average of this ratio over 
the sample period. 
+ 
Wen (2016) 
Investments 
Share of investment (trading) assets in total 
assets. Opacity measure computed as the daily 
average of this ratio over the sample period. 
+ 
Deposits 
Share of deposits in total assets. Opacity 
measure computed as the daily average of this 
ratio over the sample period. 
+ 
Berger et al. 
(2000) 
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Dependent variable 
Variable Description 
R
is
k 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 
SizeAssetsBV 
Log of the book value of total assets. Risk 
measure computed as the daily average over the 
sample period. 
+ 
Anderson and 
Fraser (2000) 
TobinQ 
Adaptation of Tobin Q. Risk measure – measured 
at the beginning of the period. Sum of the market 
value of common equity (price per share times 
number of shares) plus the book value of 
liabilities divided by the book value of assets. 
- 
CreditRisk 
Risk measure computed as the daily average of 
the loan-loss provisions to loans ratio (PL) over 
the sample period. 
+ 
Athanasoglou 
et al. (2008) 
ROAVOL 
Volatility of return on assets (ROA). Risk 
measure computed as the standard deviation of 
ROA over the sample period. 
+ 
Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2014) 
NIMVOL 
Volatility of return on net interest margin 
(NIM). Risk measure computed as the standard 
deviation of NIM over the sample period. 
+ 
ZSCORE 
z = (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is 
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions 
divided by assets, CAR is the capital-asset ratio, 
and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. 
ROA and CAR are mean values estimated over 
the sample period and σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of ROA estimated over the same 
period. 
- 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Table no. 2 shows the frequency with which the last digits of closing prices are 
observed in the US sample, the results of the clustering tests and also the values of HHI.  
 
Table no. 2 – Price clustering in the US banks’ subsample 
Last Digit Before the crisis Crisis Whole Period 
 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Panel A: Distribution of last digit of the price   
0 17216 15.43 12123 15.30 29339 15.38 
1 10338 9.27 7313 9.23 17651 9.25 
2 9894 8.87 7102 8.96 16996 8.91 
3 9837 8.82 6935 8.75 16772 8.79 
4 9865 8.84 7189 9.07 17054 8.94 
5 14104 12.64 9726 12.28 23830 12.49 
6 10104 9.06 7119 8.99 17223 9.03 
7 9779 8.76 6981 8.81 16760 8.78 
8 9892 8.87 7195 9.08 17087 8.96 
9 10540 9.45 7541 9.52 18081 9.48 
Total 111569 
 
79224 
 
190793  
% at 0 & 5 
 
28.07
 
27.58  27.87 
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Before the crisis Crisis period Whole Period 
Panel B: Clustering tests and indices 
 
  
𝜒9
2 5024.92 3239.11 8251.20 
H1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HHI (%) 10.45 10.41 10.43 
𝐹9.9 0.64 
0.73 H2 (p-value) 
  
Note: Panel A shows the absolute and the relative frequencies of prices. Panel B presents the p-value of the 
H1 and H2 hypotheses, as well as the HHI, which stands for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. 
 
Table no. 3 – Clustering of the final digit of price for various partitions of the US sample 
 
Percentage of cases clustered at a final digit of 
    Quintiles 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HHI (%) 
All prices 14.52 9.40 9.06 8.99 9.07 11.99 9.16 9.01 9.10 9.69 10.30 
Size 
1 18.49 8.91 8.14 8.10 8.32 13.94 8.61 8.05 8.29 9.16 11.08 
2 15.04 9.16 8.92 8.66 9.04 12.16 9.22 8.91 8.89 10.00 10.38 
3 13.62 9.62 9.34 9.27 9.50 11.36 9.29 9.26 9.21 9.53 10.18 
4 12.79 9.64 9.58 9.35 9.33 11.17 9.39 9.45 9.51 9.78 10.11 
5 12.70 9.69 9.33 9.57 9.14 11.30 9.31 9.39 9.62 9.95 10.11 
Price 
1 15.46 9.22 9.21 8.59 8.94 12.65 8.97 8.55 9.01 9.40 10.46 
2 14.95 9.18 8.78 8.93 9.03 12.23 9.21 8.85 8.95 9.91 10.37 
3 14.62 9.42 9.19 8.63 9.14 11.82 9.23 9.06 8.98 9.91 10.31 
4 14.05 9.54 9.02 9.35 9.07 11.61 9.41 9.13 9.14 9.67 10.23 
5 13.54 9.64 9.13 9.44 9.16 11.63 9.00 9.47 9.43 9.54 10.19 
Volatility 
1 14.47 9.28 9.41 9.10 9.13 12.10 8.84 8.86 9.12 9.67 10.30 
2 14.40 9.48 9.05 8.95 9.12 11.92 9.07 8.82 9.19 10.00 10.29 
3 14.03 9.43 9.26 9.12 9.24 11.76 9.26 9.22 9.21 9.46 10.24 
4 15.15 9.23 8.69 8.95 8.74 12.36 9.33 9.01 8.94 9.60 10.40 
5 14.58 9.59 8.90 8.82 9.11 11.79 9.32 9.14 9.06 9.70 10.30 
Turnover 
1 17.93 9.06 8.30 8.19 8.37 13.68 8.69 8.18 8.29 9.30 10.95 
2 15.45 9.10 8.97 8.63 9.01 12.17 9.24 8.86 8.90 9.65 10.42 
3 13.89 9.55 9.19 9.13 9.33 11.80 9.13 9.12 9.14 9.72 10.23 
4 12.96 9.53 9.40 9.34 9.34 11.25 9.33 9.56 9.45 9.84 10.13 
5 12.40 9.77 9.46 9.65 9.28 11.04 9.43 9.33 9.72 9.91 10.09 
Illiquidity 
1 12.40 9.81 9.42 9.41 9.50 10.85 9.45 9.62 9.56 9.98 10.08 
2 12.91 9.70 9.57 9.47 9.12 11.40 9.01 9.29 9.62 9.91 10.13 
3 14.15 9.34 9.15 9.23 9.30 11.45 9.41 9.11 9.04 9.81 10.24 
4 14.33 9.20 9.10 8.97 9.12 12.18 9.37 9.12 9.09 9.52 10.29 
5 18.85 8.96 8.07 7.86 8.29 14.07 8.57 7.92 8.21 9.20 11.17 
Note: the table shows the clustering of the final digit of price for various partitions of the US sample during 
the whole period, including the pre-crisis and the crisis period. Only the stocks with data available for all 
variables were included. The measure of clustering HHI stands for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
 
There is clear evidence of price clustering for both periods, with almost 30% of prices 
having as last digits 0 or 5. Panel B confirms the existence of a statistically significant 
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clustering for the period before the crisis and for the crisis period. The H1 null hypothesis of 
absence of clustering is clearly rejected for both periods for a significance level of 1%. HHI 
values decrease slightly from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period, but this difference is not 
statistically significant. The nonexistence of a higher level of clustering in the crisis period 
goes counter what is predicted by the Panic Trading hypothesis (Narayan and Smyth, 2013). 
Table no. 3 shows a more detailed analysis of price clustering as a function of some 
variables representative of company-specific attributes. 
For each one of the attributes (size, price level, volatility, turnover and illiquidity), we 
sort the stocks into quintiles from low to high. According to the Price Resolution/Negotiation 
hypotheses, one would expect a higher level of clustering for smaller and more volatile banks, 
for higher price levels, for less traded shares and for higher levels of illiquidity. 
The results of this analysis partially confirm the predictions of the Price 
Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses. In fact, it is noticeable that the factors size and turnover 
seem to be negatively related to clustering and that there is a higher price concentration for 
higher levels of illiquidity. The results for the price and volatility variables are inconclusive.  
Table no. 4 shows the results regarding the sample of European banks. The evidence is 
analogous to that obtained with the US sample. 
 
Table no. 4 – Price clustering in the European banks’ subsample 
Last Digit Before the crisis Crisis Whole Period 
 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Panel A: Distribution of last digit of the price   
0 5489 27.79 4143 25.62 9632 26.81 
1 1017 5.15 988 6.11 2005 5.58 
2 1878 9.51 1479 9.15 3357 9.34 
3 1043 5.28 936 5.79 1979 5.51 
4 1883 9.53 1623 10.04 3506 9.76 
5 2313 11.71 1818 11.24 4131 11.50 
6 1880 9.52 1490 9.21 3370 9.38 
7 1036 5.24 993 6.14 2029 5.65 
8 2016 10.21 1563 9.66 3579 9.96 
9 1198 6.06 1139 7.04 2337 6.51 
Total 19753  16172  35925  
% at 0 & 5 
 
39.50  36.86  38.31 
 
Before the crisis Crisis period Whole Period 
Panel B: Clustering tests and indices 
 
  
𝜒9
2 7979.98 4907.53 12810.72 
H1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HHI (%) 14.04 13.03 13.57 
𝐹9.9 0.61 
0.75 H2 (p-value) 
Note: Panel A shows the absolute and the relative frequencies of prices. Panel B presents the p-value of the 
H1 and H2 hypotheses, as well as the HHI, which stands for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. 
 
Again, there is an abnormal concentration in prices, even more pronounced than in the 
sample of US banks. The percentage of prices whose last digit is 0 or 5 is around 40% and 
37% for the period before the crisis and for the crisis period, respectively. The results also 
indicate a clear rejection of the null hypothesis H1 and, consequently, the presence of 
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statistically significant price clustering in both periods. HHI is slightly higher in the period 
before the crisis, but the results of the H2 hypothesis test, as happened in the US sample, do 
not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of similar clustering levels in the two periods. 
Table no. 5 presents a detailed analysis of clustering of the final digit of price for various 
partitions of the European sample. 
 
Table no. 5 – Clustering of the final digit of price for various partitions of the European sample 
 
Percentage of cases clustered at a final digit of 
    Quintiles 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HHI (%) 
All prices 24.97 5.68 9.82 5.67 10.39 10.56 9.88 5.86 10.58 6.60 12.91 
Size 
1 19.04 4.72 11.97 5.41 12.77 7.97 12.19 6.33 12.58 7.02 11.80 
2 23.91 6.45 8.65 6.73 10.13 12.87 8.71 5.86 9.31 7.37 12.53 
3 24.61 5.96 9.75 5.57 10.12 11.66 9.59 5.93 10.37 6.45 12.82 
4 28.71 4.75 10.41 4.33 10.83 7.38 11.31 5.13 11.91 5.26 14.69 
5 28.53 6.53 8.34 6.29 8.10 12.88 7.60 6.08 8.75 6.91 14.16 
Price 
1 21.55 4.39 11.86 4.44 14.55 8.04 12.59 4.49 12.81 5.30 12.91 
2 15.25 7.24 10.88 8.18 10.10 10.33 10.47 8.34 10.72 8.49 10.45 
3 31.10 4.40 9.86 4.28 10.08 8.26 10.56 4.57 11.87 4.99 15.71 
4 22.67 7.03 9.43 6.53 9.76 11.95 9.31 6.98 9.00 7.33 12.03 
5 34.31 5.33 7.07 4.88 7.45 14.19 6.45 4.93 8.52 6.87 17.22 
Volatility 
1 20.98 6.45 9.40 7.10 9.80 10.44 9.46 7.80 10.14 8.44 11.50 
2 18.90 7.52 9.47 7.83 10.29 11.39 9.57 7.35 9.97 7.71 11.05 
3 29.71 2.21 14.03 1.83 15.28 3.15 14.59 2.13 14.81 2.27 17.73 
4 26.30 4.94 9.94 5.47 10.04 10.93 9.20 5.67 11.15 6.37 13.47 
5 28.99 7.25 6.31 6.06 6.57 16.81 6.62 6.34 6.88 8.18 14.93 
Turnover 
1 30.81 3.34 11.80 3.06 11.85 6.73 12.11 3.12 13.25 3.92 16.42 
2 26.66 5.33 9.49 5.61 9.82 9.96 9.60 5.92 11.03 6.60 13.49 
3 23.20 4.74 10.78 5.28 12.65 9.66 11.06 5.00 11.50 6.11 12.76 
4 26.38 6.61 8.34 5.55 9.12 12.73 8.23 6.58 8.40 8.06 13.32 
5 17.85 8.35 8.71 8.78 8.52 13.68 8.40 8.66 8.75 8.29 10.92 
Illiquidity 
1 17.82 8.23 8.97 8.50 8.83 13.29 8.18 8.66 8.72 8.81 10.88 
2 21.61 7.22 7.98 7.64 8.15 14.54 7.88 8.07 8.19 8.73 11.89 
3 28.76 6.37 8.12 6.03 8.10 12.58 7.63 5.83 9.30 7.28 14.26 
4 25.74 5.52 8.91 5.33 9.94 10.91 10.19 5.86 10.32 7.28 13.16 
5 31.03 0.99 15.22 0.66 17.06 1.26 15.63 0.82 16.49 0.82 20.06 
Note: The table shows the clustering of the final digit of price for various partitions of the European sample 
during the whole period, including the pre-crisis and the crisis period. Only the stocks with data available 
for all variables were included. HHI, the measure of clustering, stands for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
 
The results suggest a positive relationship between bank size and the level of 
clustering. As for the other specific attributes, the results confirm the Price Resolution/ 
Negotiation hypotheses with respect to turnover and illiquidity. This analysis also seems to 
suggest larger levels of clustering for stocks with higher prices, whereas the results are 
inconclusive regarding volatility. 
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In sum, the results point to the presence of clustering in all periods of both samples. 
The digits 0 and 5 are invariably the most frequently observed. The level of clustering seems 
to be higher in the sample of European banks. Surprisingly, we did not find any statistically 
significant differences between the pre-crisis and the crisis clustering levels, either for the 
sample of European banks or for the sample of US banks. Our univariate analysis partially 
confirmed the predictions of the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses, as well as the 
Attraction hypothesis. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
4.2.1 US banks 
 
For each sample and for each period two models were estimated, one with all the 
explanatory variables (I) and other where one variable whose correlation coefficient with 
other factors is high (greater than 0.6) was excluded in order to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity (II). Table no. 6 presents the results for the US sample. 
According to the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses, the variables "Price", 
"RetVol" and "Illiquidity" should have a positive relationship with clustering, while the 
variables "Size" and "Turnover" should be negatively associated with the phenomenon. On 
one hand, our results show that the relation predicted by the theory for the variables 
"Turnover" and "Illiquidity" is confirmed at a statistically significant level of 1% for the 
"Illiquidity" variable in both periods, with the "Turnover" variable being also statistically 
significant at a level of 1% in the period before the crisis. On the other hand, the expected 
results for the variables "Size" and "RetVol" are not confirmed. Moreover, the variable "Price" 
is not statistically significant. On an overall assessment, we can conclude that the Price 
Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses are only partially confirmed in our sample of US banks. 
“Size” is statistically significant at a significance level of 10% for both periods in the 
model with all the explanatory variables. However this variable only has significant 
explanatory power for the crisis period in the reduced model. As we have mentioned above 
the results show a relationship between this variable and the dependent variable that is 
surprising according to the Price Resolution hypothesis. However, the variable 
"SizeAssetsBV", which captures the banks' risk has coefficients with a negative sign for 
both periods, corresponding to what is predicted by the Price Resolution/Negotiation 
hypotheses. In the second model, the “Size” variable continues to show a coefficient with a 
positive sign in the crisis period which runs counter to what was expected.  
The "PastReturns" variable is not statistically significant for any of the periods under 
analysis. The variable "BTM" variable is statistically significant only for the period before 
the crisis, having negative regression coefficients. This suggests that growth stocks are more 
affected by clustering in the period before the crisis. The "AnalystCoverage" variable is not 
statistically significant in all estimated models for significance levels of 10%. 
The variables that measure the banks’ opacity present dissimilar results. The variables 
“Loans” and “Investments” are only statistically significant at the conventional levels in the 
crisis period, while the variable “Deposits” has no statistical significance in any of the 
periods. 
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Table no. 6 – Determinants of price clustering (US sample) 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  
The variables “SizeAssetsBV”, "TobinQ" and “CreditRisk  that measure the banks’ 
risks are only statistically significant for the periods before the crisis. The sign of the 
coefficient of "TobinQ" in this period is negative, which is in accordance with the theory. 
As for the variables “SizeAssetsBV” and "CreditRisk", they present a negative coefficient, 
 
Before the crisis Crisis period  
Variable (I) (II) (I) (II) Expected sign 
α 
0.0066*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0003) 
 
Size 
0.0128** 
(0.0050) 
0.0007 
(0.0012) 
0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0008) 
- 
Price 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
+ 
RetVol 
-0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
+ 
Turnover 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0012 
(0.0008) 
-0.0011 
(0.0008) 
- 
Illiquidity 
0.0041*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0046*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0044*** 
(0.0005) 
+ 
PastReturns 
-0.0005 
(0.0006) 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
- 
BTM 
-0.0027** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0012 
(0.0011) 
0.0000 
(0.0007) 
-0.0001 
(0.0007) 
- 
AnalystCoverage 
0.0010 
(0.0008) 
0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
- 
Loans 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
-0.0012 
(0.0009) 
-0.0011* 
(0.0007) 
-0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
+ 
Investments 
-0.0010 
(0.0008) 
-0.0016* 
(0.0008) 
-0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0006) 
+ 
Deposits 
0.0000 
(0.0009) 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
+ 
SizeAssetsBV 
-0.0123** 
(0.0050)  
-0.0015 
(0.0018)  
+ 
TobinQ 
-0.0044** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0009 
(0.0011) 
-0.0009 
(0.0007) 
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 
- 
CreditRisk 
-0.0011** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0010* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
+ 
ROAVOL 
0.0019 
(0.0101) 
0.0104 
(0.0097) 
-0.0024 
(0.0089) 
-0.0017 
(0.0089) 
+ 
NIMVOL 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
+ 
ZSCORE 
0.0018 
(0.0102) 
0.0100 
(0.0098) 
-0.0024 
(0.0089) 
-0.0017 
(0.0089) 
- 
  
    
 
R-squared 0.4334 0.4132 0.5625 0.5608  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.3774 0.3589 0.5192 0.5201 
 
F-statistic 7.7385 7.6133 13.0066 13.8037  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
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contrary to what was expected. The remaining variables, "ROAVOL", "NIMVOL" and 
"ZSCORE" are not statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
The variables that best appear to explain clustering are “Size”, “RetVol”, and 
“Illiquidity”. “Size” and “Illiquidity” positively affect the level of clustering and the 
volatility of returns has a negative impact on it. Only the relationship between “Illiquidity” 
and the dependent variable is consistent with what is predicted by the Price Resolution/ 
Negotiation hypotheses. 
 
4.2.2 European banks 
 
Table no. 7 presents the regressions’ results for the sample of European banks. 
The evidence regarding the model that includes all explanatory variables (model I) 
indicates that the relation predicted by the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses for the 
variables “Price”, “RetVol”, "Turnover" and "Illiquidity" is confirmed at the conventional 
levels of statistical significance, although some of these variables are only significant for 
one of the periods under scrutiny. The variable “RetVol” presents some explanatory power 
in the period before the crisis, but it does not explain price clustering in the crisis period. 
“Turnover”, in turn, only has some explanatory power in the crisis period. The expected 
results for the variable "Size" are not confirmed. This variable seems to explain the price 
clustering phenomenon better in the period before the crisis than in the crisis period. 
Statistically, the difference between the coefficients from one period to the other is not 
significant. Because they showed high correlation coefficients with other variables, “Size” 
and “SizeAssetsBV” were eliminated from the most complete model and a new regression 
without these variables was estimated for each of the periods (model II), without greatly 
affecting the results. 
Overall, we can conclude that the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses are only 
partially confirmed in our sample of European banks. 
"PastReturns" and "AnalystCoverage" do not contribute to explain the price clustering. 
The "BTM" variable is statistically significant for the period before the crisis and it has a 
negative coefficient. The variables "Loans", “Investments" and "Deposits" have no 
significant explanatory power. Thus, the opacity factor does not seem to be relevant for the 
price clustering in European banks. 
Regarding the risk measures, the variable "SizeAssetsBV" is statistically significant for 
the period before the crisis, presenting a negative coefficient. This is in accordance with the 
Price Resolution theory. “TobinQ”, another measure of risk, only explains the clustering in 
the pre-crisis period. The negative coefficient is consistent with the prediction that a higher 
risk tends to generate stronger price clustering. "CreditRisk", "ROAVOL" and "ZSCORE" 
are not statistically significant for any of the periods and "NIMVOL" is statistically 
significant only for the pre-crisis period. However, the negative coefficient runs counter to 
what is predicted by the theory. These results suggest that risk only seems to explain 
clustering in Europe in the period leading to the Global Financial Crisis. 
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Table no. 7 – Determinants of price clustering (European sample) 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
In sum, “Price” and “Illiquidity” are the variables that best seem to explain the 
variation in clustering in European banks. There are some factors (for example, “Size”, 
“RetVol”, “BTM”) that contribute to explain this variation in only one of the periods. 
 
 
Before the crisis Crisis period  
Variable (I) (II) (I) (II) Expected sign 
 
0.0671*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0671*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0507*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0507*** 
(0.0067) 
 
Size 
0.2124** 
(0.0764)  
0.0807 
(0.0508)  
- 
Price 
0.0364*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0280** 
(0.0129) 
0.0275** 
(0.0117) 
0.0323** 
(0.0122) 
+ 
RetVol 
0.0198* 
(0.0112) 
0.0110 
(0.0110) 
-0.0012 
(0.0126) 
-0.0046 
(0.0114) 
+ 
Turnover 
0.0040 
(0.0131) 
0.0017 
(0.0127) 
-0.0265* 
(0.0130) 
-0.0183 
(0.0128) 
- 
Illiquidity 
0.0347** 
(0.0139) 
0.0391** 
(0.0163) 
0.0240* 
(0.0123) 
0.0236* 
(0.0131) 
+ 
PastReturns 
-0.0077 
(0.0094) 
-0.0045 
(0.0109) 
-0.0052 
(0.0083) 
-0.0030 
(0.0086) 
- 
BTM 
-0.0847*** 
(0.0253) 
-0.0436* 
(0.0245) 
0.0136 
(0.0215) 
0.0212 
(0.0218) 
- 
AnalystCoverage 
-0.0173 
(0.0138) 
-0.0124 
(0.0154) 
0.0031 
(0.0106) 
0.0097 
(0.0097) 
- 
Loans 
-0.0065 
(0.0159) 
-0.0065 
(0.0174) 
-0.0060 
(0.0180) 
-0.0055 
(0.0179) 
+ 
Investments 
0.0088 
(0.0159) 
-0.0015 
(0.0183) 
-0.0105 
(0.0147) 
-0.0037 
(0.0131) 
+ 
Deposits 
-0.0152 
(0.0207) 
0.0147 
(0.0210) 
-0.0034 
(0.0188) 
0.0094 
(0.0190) 
+ 
SizeAssetsBV 
-0.2388*** 
(0.0789)  
-0.0581 
(0.0571) 
 
 
+ 
TobinQ 
-0.1095*** 
(0.0339) 
-0.0310 
(0.0256) 
0.0026 
(0.0221) 
0.0230 
(0.0188) 
- 
CreditRisk 
-0.0141 
(0.0086) 
-0.0088 
(0.0098) 
0.0001 
(0.0129) 
-0.0046 
(0.0135) 
+ 
ROAVOL 
-0.0381 
(0.0393) 
0.0183 
(0.0404) 
0.0036 
(0.0320) 
0.0032 
(0.0340) 
+ 
NIMVOL 
-0.0174* 
(0.0085) 
-0.0091 
(0.0093) 
-0.0050 
(0.0112) 
-0.0175* 
(0.0099) 
+ 
ZSCORE 
-0.0496 
(0.0405) 
0.0070 
(0.0421) 
-0.0100 
(0.0316) 
-0.0101 
(0.0337) 
- 
R-squared 0.8204 0.7198 0.8133 0.7626  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.6407 0.4985 0.6265 0.5752  
F-statistic 4.5665 3.2533 4.3550 4.0692  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0016 0.0085 0.0021 0.0024  
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4.2.3 Comparing US banks with European banks 
 
Our results partially confirm the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses. In both 
samples, the variables “Turnover” and “Illiquidity” have a relation with price clustering as 
predicted by the theory, although “Turnover” is only statistically significant in the crisis 
period in the European sample. “Illiquidity” is the only explanatory variable that helps to 
explain the price clustering for both geographical areas and for both periods. The results for 
“Price” and “RetVol” in the European banks’ sample also support the Price 
Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses, while “Size” has a relation with clustering in both 
samples that goes against what was expected. 
The "BTM" variable is statistically significant only for the periods before the crisis in 
both samples. The negative coefficient is in accordance with the theory.  
“Loans” and “Investments” capture banks’ opacity and present explanatory power 
during the crisis period in the US. However, the relationship with clustering is not in 
accordance to what was expected. In the European sample, all opacity variables are not 
statistically significant. Regarding the risk measures, “SizeAssetsBV” and “TobinQ” have 
some explanatory power but only in the pre-crisis period. “Credit Risk” is also relevant to 
explain clustering in this period but only in the US. The results for the variable “TobinQ” 
also support the theory. We can conclude from these results that opacity and risk do not 
contribute significantly to the degree of clustering at the firm level. 
There are variables that do not contribute to this explanation in any of the periods and 
geographic areas under analysis: “PastReturns”, “AnalystCoverage”, “Deposits”, 
“ROAVOL” and “ZSCORE”. 
It is also worth noting that the coefficients of a large part of the variables between the 
two periods under analysis do not differ significantly. In the US sample, for example, only 
“Size” exhibits a decrease in the positive impact on the clustering level from the pre-crisis 
period to the crisis period. This suggests that the Global Financial Crisis did not play a 
significant role in the phenomenon of price clustering in bank stocks. 
 
4.3 Impact of the European sovereign debt crisis 
 
In addition to the analyses that we have already presented, it seemed appropriate to 
extend this study to the sovereign debt crisis that occurred in Europe. 
The sovereign debt crisis had a substantial economic and political impact on Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. The purpose of this analysis is to separate the sample of European 
banks into two subsamples: one with the banks of countries affected by the crisis and another 
with the other banks of European countries where the crisis has not had a significant impact.  
We conduct a similar analysis to that implemented in the univariate analysis, based on 
the comparison between the price clustering levels between the two subsamples of European 
banks. The period of analysis considered runs between September 1, 2008 and August 4, 
2011, following the crisis period defined by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013). Table no. 8 
presents the results. 
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Table no. 8 – Impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on price clustering 
Last Digit       Affected countries   Non-affected countries 
    
Frequency % 
 
Frequency % 
Panel A: Distribution of last digit of the price 
    0 
   
2727 16.39 
 
2333 26.80 
1 
   
1401 8.42 
 
671 7.71 
2 
   
1585 9.53 
 
599 6.88 
3 
   
1346 8.09 
 
588 6.75 
4 
   
1529 9.19 
 
537 6.17 
5 
   
2099 12.62 
 
1463 16.80 
6 
   
1496 8.99 
 
587 6.74 
7 
   
1339 8.05 
 
497 5.71 
8 
   
1640 9.86 
 
682 7.83 
9 
   
1476 8.87 
 
749 8.60 
Total 
   
16638 
  
8706 
 % at 0 & 5 
    
29.01
  
43.60
    
Affected countries 
 
Non-affected countries 
Panel B: Clustering tests and indices 
    𝜒9
2 
   
1011.97 
 
3520.18 
H1 (p-value) 
   
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
HHI (%) 
   
10.61 
 
14.04 
𝐹9.9 
   
3.48 
H2 (p-value) 
   
0.0387 
Note: Panel A shows the absolute and the relative frequencies of prices. Panel B presents the p-value of the H1 
and H2 hypotheses, as well as the HHI, which stands for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. The sample of 
European banks was divided into two subsamples: a sample with the banks of countries affected by the European 
sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and other with the banks of European countries where 
the crisis has not had such a significant impact (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Romania). 
 
We can conclude that there are signs of an abnormal concentration of prices for both 
samples, as suggested by the p-values of the H1 hypothesis. Once again, digits 0 and 5 are the 
most frequently observed, reaching a percentage of more than 40% in the sample of non-
affected countries, more than twice what would be expected if the price distribution was 
uniform. Analyzing the results of Panel B, we can also see that the HHI for the sample of 
countries where the sovereign debt crisis has not been felt so strongly is significantly higher 
than for the sample of countries affected by the crisis. The clustering observed in the stock 
prices of the banks of unaffected countries is, at a level of statistical significance of 5%, higher 
than that observed in the sample of the countries that had problems with their public debt. 
The evidence of a lower level of clustering at times of crisis is quite surprising, being 
however in line the previously presented results. The implications of this result are further 
discussed in the conclusion. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on price clustering in 
US and European banking stocks. 
Our evidence confirms the existence of significant price clustering in both geographies. 
Investors exhibit a clear preference for prices with a final digit of 0 and 5 which is consistent 
with the Attraction hypothesis. The existence of a pervasive pattern of accumulation of 
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prices in certain digits is difficult to reconcile with the Efficient Market hypothesis since one 
of the tenets of an efficient market is that prices should follow a random walk. The empirical 
finding that clustering leads to desestabilized stock prices seems to underline the apparent 
conflict between the phenomenon and stock market efficiency (Blau and Griffith, 2016). 
The observation that prices tend to be settled more frequently at some numbers than others 
also carry practical implications for traders. It has been shown that investors can devise 
profitable trading strategies to exploit clustering effects even after considering the bid-ask 
spread (Niederhoffer, 1965; Mitchell, 2001). Examples of such strategies are provided in 
Niederhoffer (1965). 
We conduct one of the first tests to the recently proposed Panic Trading hypothesis 
(Narayan and Smyth, 2013) by examining the difference between the levels of price clustering 
observed before the crisis and in the crisis period. Our results do not reveal a significant 
increase in the levels of price clustering in the crisis period which is at odds with the Panic 
Trading hypothesis. In fact, the crisis period witnessed a lower level of price clustering. 
We also performed a multivariate analysis of price clustering in order to understand the 
firm-specific factors that produce price clustering effects. In both samples, the variables 
“Turnover” and “Illiquidity” present a statistical significant relation with price clustering. 
These results are consistent with the Price Resolution/Negotiation hypotheses.  
The evidence of a lower level of clustering at times of crisis is quite surprising. This 
relationship between the level of clustering and periods of crisis suggests that investors are 
less affected by behavioral factors in periods of greater pessimism. This finding is consistent 
with some contributions in the literature. For example, the mood-as-information hypothesis 
argues that mood affects human decisions and that, as argued by Schwarz (1990, p. 527), 
"negative affective states, which inform the organism that its current situation is 
problematic, foster the use of effortful, detail-oriented, analytical processing, whereas 
positive affective states foster the use of less effortful heuristic strategies". Moreover, Alloy 
and Abramson (1979) conclude that individuals, at depressive times, tend to be more 
realistic and more analytical in their appraisals (the "sadder but wiser" effect). Isen (1987), 
Sinclair and Mark (1995) and Durand et al. (2009) suggest that individuals make more 
logical, consistent and unbiased decisions when they find themselves in a negative affective 
state, a consequence of an instinct to turn a bad situation into a good one.  
In addition to these studies, some Behavioral Finance papers suggest that investors are 
better at processing information at times when the market sentiment is negative. For 
example, Cooper et al. (2004) find that the profits to momentum strategies depend critically 
on the state of the market. Investors seem to interpret the information in a more efficient 
fashion in periods of negative mood. García (2013) corroborates this reasoning showing that 
prices reflect much more quickly the news published in the financial section of The New 
York Times during periods of recession. Thus, at the origin of this relationship between the 
periods of crisis and the level of price clustering might be a greater rationality and analytical 
capacity of investors in periods of negative sentiment. 
Finally, as suggestions for further research, it would be interesting to ascertain the 
impact of other crises on price clustering. In addition, it would also be of interest to 
understand the impact of market trends on the phenomenon.  
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